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SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA - EXTINCTION OF
THE "NEW BUFFALO?"
Michael Grant*
L Introduction - The Need for Indian Gaming
Many Native Americans refer to Indian gaming as the "New Buffalo."'
This name is much deserved. Indian gaming is an industry which has
provided tribal nations with the "first real means of maintaining an
autonomous existence since the great buffalo roamed the plains centuries
ago."2 In fact, since the United States Supreme Court's decision in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.' Indian tribes have greatly improved
their economic status through gaming. Historically, tribal reservations were
stifled by "unemployment, welfare dependency and substandard housing and
infrastructure."4 Because of the advantages provided by gaming, however, the
Indian tribes have been able to provide a steady source of capital for the
tribes while attracting tourism and increasing employment.5 Indeed, gaming
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I. Jason D. Kolkema, Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands and the
Threat to State Sovereignty: Retaining Gubernatorial Authority over the Federal Approval of
Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. DET. MERcY L. REV. 361, 361 (1996).
2. Id. It should be noted that Indian gaming is not unknown to Indian traditions. Indeed,
"[w~agers on contests of skill, horse races, a variety of dice games, and a unique Indian game
known as the stick game have been popular with many Indian tribes for thousands of years."
William E. Horwitz, Note, Scope of Gaming Under the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of
1988 After Rumsey v. Wilson: White Buffalo or Brown Cow?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
153, 158 (1996).
3. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). In Cabazon, the Supreme Court decided whether the state of
California could enforce its gaming laws on the Cabazon Indian reservation. Id. at 205-06. The
Court held that the state was without jurisdiction because states can not impose regulations on
reservation gaming operations. The Court determined this by following a rule in which state law
may be applicable when it is prohibitory and inapplicable when regulatory. Id. at 209. For a
thorough discussion on Cabazon, see Connie K. Haslam, Note, Indian Sovereignty: Confusion
Prevails - California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 63 WASH. L. REv. 169 (1988).
4. Kolkema, supra note 1, at 361.
5. Id. In discussing the benefits of casino gaming, Ray Halbritter, the Nation Representative
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has become a very lucrative business.'
In fact, gaming is an essential means of attaining tribal self-sufficiency and
self-government." This has now been confirmed by several studies. These
studies indicate a series of impacts that stimulate economic growth.' All the
benefits which necessarily follow from increased employment multiply at a
high rate. This is referred to as the "multiplier effect."9 Gaming additionally
increases the number of visitors to tribal reservations. These visitors
contribute to the economic growth because they frequently spend money on
goods 'and services beyond mere gaming.'
It is important to note that all revenues from gaming operations are
reinvested in the tribal community to advance tribal economic development
as mandated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)." For example,
in 1994 the Mashantucket Pequot Indians in southeastern Connecticut
generated over $800 million dollars from their Foxwoods Casino." The
Pequots have used this money to employ every member of the tribe and pay
of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, stated that "[ihe casino is not a statement of who we
are, but only a means to get us to where we want to be. We had tried poverty for 200 years, so
we decided to try something else." Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul MeSloy, Empowerment or
Dependence? The Practical Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. 1.
INT'L L. 8 POL. 531, 567-68 (1994); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Article: Virtue or
Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 381, 381 (1997).
6. Of the nation's 550 recognized tribes, more than 200 participate in high-stakes gaming.
Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Symposium: The Dilemma of American Federalism:
Power to the People, the States, or the Federal Government? Who Will Control the Future of
Indian Gaming? "A Few Pages-of History are Worth a Volume of Logic", 1996 BYU L. REV.
407, 407-08 (1996). "Indian gaming produces about $7 billion in gross revenues annually, of
which the Tribes net between $750 million and $1 billion." Id. at 408.
7. For more on tribal self-sufficiency, see FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 122 (Univ. of N.M. photo reprint 1971) (1942).
8. Kolkema, supra note 1, at 361.
9. Id. The multiplier effect refers to the process by which wages from employment are
spent on goods and services, which in turn, provide employment and wages to producers of such
goods and services. Id. (citing DELOrTrE & TOUCHE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CASINO GAMING
ON THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1995) (on file with the University of Detroit Mercy Law Review)).
10. Id.
11. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)(2) (1994). The statue provides for the following:
(B) net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other
than -
(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs;
(ii) to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members;
(iii) to promote tribal economic development;
(iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or
(v) to help fund operations of local government agencies.
Id.
12. Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian
Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REv. 711, 724-25 (1996).
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these members between $50,000 and $60,000 a year. 3 Additionally, the
Pequot Tribe has guaranteed that it will pay for all of its members' education
from preschool through a doctorate. 4 Finally, the Pequots have contributed
$10 million to the federal government for the building of an American Indian
Museum."
Moreover, the economic effects of Indian gaming are felt far beyond the
reservations. For example, it is estimated that one gaming job generates, on
average, 1.4 additional jobs in the host economy." Thus, as a result of
gaming, Indian tribes have been better able to achieve self-sufficiency and
their host economies are greatly benefitted as well.'
II. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act - Its Intended Purpose
Several years before the passage of the IGRA, President Reagan reaffirmed
President Nixon's Indian Policy 8 which had initially cited the need for
greater tribal self-governance and economic self-sufficiency. President
Reagan's Policy noted that "[a] fundamental prerequisite to economic
development is capital formation. The establishment of a financial structure
that is a part of the Indian reservation community is essential to the
development of Indian capital formation. '"i" Hence, President Reagan
concluded that this goal can be achieved only by "removing the federal
impediments to tribal self-government."'"
13. Id. at 725.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Pequot tribe has also employed an archaeologist to "uncover its history and to
stock its new museum." Id.
16. Robert Robinson, The Economic Impact of Indian-Reservation Based Gaming Activities,
in RESERVATION-BASED GAMING 9, 13 n.3 (Glen Feldman & O'Connor Cavanagh eds., 1993).
17. The Pequot Tribe, for example, has paid Connecticut over $100 million to protect its
current monopoly over slot machines. Mezey, supra note 12, at 725.
18. "Mhe Reagan Administration was altering policy towards Indians in the United States
by reducing direct subsidies to Indian tribes and encouraging greater economic self-sufficiency
and entrepreneurial activity to replace ... the bankrupted paternalistic policies toward Indian
tribes of the past one hundred years." William R. Eadington, Preface, in INDIAN GAMING AND
THE LAv v, vii (William Eadington ed., 1990).
19. In 1968 President Nixon stated that he wanted to strengthen tribal sovereignty, transfer
programs from the federal government to the tribal government, and secure Indian land bases.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian
Policy, H.R. DOC. No. 363, 91st Cong. 1 (1968). Moreover, President Nixon argued that federal
legislation should not continue to be paternalist. Id. at 101. For more on the era of self-
determination, see STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES - THE BAsic
ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 8-9 (2nd ed. 1993).
20. Karen S. McFadden, Note, The Stakes Are Too High To Gamble Away Tribal Self-
Government, Self-Sufficiency and Economic Development When Amending the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807, 823 (1996) (citing President's Policy on Indians, WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc., Jan 28, 1993, at 101).
21. Id. at 823 (citing President's Policy on Indians, supra note 20, at 99).
COMMENTSNo. 1]
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The IGRA promotes these same objectives, and these objectives are
"clearly met by Indian gaming."' The Policy stated that the "'economies of
American Indian reservations [were] extremely depressed, with unemployment
rates among the highest in the country'" before the proliferation of Indian
gaming, and past attempts to stimulate their economies failed."' Currently,
however, the advantages of Class III gaming are shared by Indians and non-
Indians alike allowing Indians to take pride in their culture, independence, and
gaming success while still allowing non-Indians to benefit as well.'
It is important to note the IGRA's purpose is "to provide a statutory basis
for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."'
The IGRA, however, does more than protect the tribes. States' rights were
also a powerful consideration when Congress enacted the legislation..
In fact, it was over strong opposition by the tribes that the states persuaded
Congress to include an escape provision in the IGRA, i.e., the compacting
requirement. This controversial provision prohibited an Indian tribe from
engaging in casino gaming 'without a state-approved gaming compact.
Congress' reasons for including the compacting requirement, were due partly
in response to states' fears that tribes would not exercise self-restraint, and
partly in response to political pressures.' The IGRA divided Indian gaming
into three categories:
Class I: "[S]ocial games solely for prizes of minimal value."'
Class II: "[G]ame[s] of chance commonly known as bingo .. .includ-
ing ... pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo ... and card
games that (I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or (I) are not
explicitly prohibited. [C]lass II gaming does not include any banking card
games, including baccarat . . . or blackjack (21), or electronic or
electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any
kind."
Class I1: "[A]ll forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II
gaming. "
As a prerequisite to Class I gaming, the IGRA requires that a tribe and
a state enter into a compact covering conditions of play.'
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing President's Policy on Indians, supra note 20, at 100).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 823-24. For a thorough discussion on the legislative history of the IGRA, see
Horwitz, supra note 2, at 164-74.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994).
27. Id. §§ 2701-2721.
28. Id. § 2703(6).
29. Id. § 2703(7).
30. Id. § 2703(8).




In an effort to even the odds between the tribes and the states, Congress
mandated that the states negotiate for compacts in good faith. Indeed, if the
state did not meet this provision, Congress expressly granted Indian tribes the
power to sue the states in federal district court.
III. The Case
A. Procedural History
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,3 2 the Seminole Tribe of Florida
(the Tribe) brought suit against the State of Florida (the State) under rights
provided by Congress through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).33
The IGRA expressly grants a tribe the power to sue a state in federal court
to compel good faith negotiations toward the formation of a gaming
compact.0 The State asserted its sovereign immunity from suit and moved
to dismiss the Tribe's complaint. The district court denied the State's
motion.35 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, however,
and found Congress did not have the authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the power delegated to Congress through the
Indian Commerce Clause.' The Court also found that the doctrine set forth
in Ex parte Young does not permit a tribe to sue a state's governor in order
to compel good faith negotiations.3
B. The Majority Opinion
In a controversial 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' dismissal of the Tribe's suit. In doing so, the majority held that: (1)
Congress lacks authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,39 and (2) the
doctrine of Ex parte Young may not be used to enforce the IGRA against a
state official.'
In regard to the issue of immunity, the Court found that the Eleventh
Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes individual lawsuits
brought under federal question as well as diversity jurisdiction.4' In order to
32. 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S.
Ct. 1119 (1996).
33. Id.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
35. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 656.
36. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, I1 F.3d 1016, 1026 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996).
37. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
38. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1028.
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justify this somewhat controversial Eleventh Amendment claim, the majority
relied upon Hans as stare decisis, and Rehnquist relied upon Number 81 of
the Federalist to support his view of the Eleventh Amendment. 2 The Court
also recognized that Congress may abrogate a state's immunity if it has
"unequivocally expressed its intent" to do so, "pursuant to a valid exercise of
power."43 In the present case, Congress' intent to abrogate the states'
immunity from suit was "unmistakably clear.""' On the other hand, the issue
of Congress' power to abrogate was explored more fully by the Court.
The Court explored the question of whether the IGRA was passed pursuant
to a valid constitutional provision. The IGRA was enacted by Congress under
authority granted by the Indian Commerce Clause. In the instant case, the
Court reasoned that the Indian Commerce Cause is indistinguishable from the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Therefore, the Court's reasoning implicated
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which recognizes Congress' authority,
under the Interstate Commerce Clause, to abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity. Rather than attempt to distinguish the instant case from Union Gas,
the Court overturned the earlier opinion, declaring it "wrongly decided."'
Union Gas, the Court found, had been proven to be a "solitary departure from
established law."'47 Ultimately, the Court rejected Union Gas because the
divided opinion deviated from the Supreme Court's established federalism
jurisprudence and caused confusion in the lower courts.! Furthermore, the
Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment's express- limitation on
diversity actions implied a general limitation on federal question actions.
Moreover, the Court determined that the doctrine of Ex parte Young4 may
not be used to enforce the IGRA against a state official." The Ex parte
Young doctrine allows a suit to proceed against a .state official,
notwithstanding any claims of state sovereign immunity' The Court found
that the intricate remedial scheme created by the IGRA allows a suit to be
brought against a state but not against a state's officials.' The Court found
that since Congress did not expressly provide for the availability of Ex parte
Young, it would not rewrite the statutory enforcement scheme to "approximate
42. See infra Part IV.
43. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
44. Id. at 1123-24; see U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (1994).
45. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
46. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).






what it thinks Congress might have wanted had it known that [abrogation of
state sovereign immunity] was beyond its authority." 3
C. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent began by tersely examining the fundamental
question at issue: "This case is about power - the power of the Congress of
the United States to create a private federal cause of action against a State, or
its Governor, for the violation of a federal right."' Stevens further stated:
"There can be no serious debate.., over whether Congress has the power to
ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State
being sued. Congress' authority in that regard is clear."'5
In his dissent, Justice Stevens examined the origins of the modem doctrine
of state sovereign immunity. He derided the majority's assertion that "the
Eleventh Amendment's express but partial limitation on [diversity actions
found within] Article III reveals that an implicit but more general limitation
was already in place."'
Justice Stevens cited the opinion in Hans v. Louisiana in support of the
conclusion that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was a common-law
rule that Congress had directed the federal courts to respect, not a
constitutional privilege that Congress could not displace by statute? The
ruling in Hans, Stevens argued, was based on the fact that Congress had not
attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign
immunity."
Justice Stevens insisted that the Court's "fundamental error" was "its failure
to acknowledge that its modem embodiment of the ancient doctrine of
sovereign immunity 'has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial
power contained in the Eleventh Amendment."'"m  Moreover, Stevens
suggested that he would be willing to adhere to a judge-created common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity.6 ' Stevens determined, however, that a
common law doctrine could not bar Congress from abrogating state immunity
when it clearly expressed its intention to do so.' z In the instant case, Stevens
53. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1134.
56. Id. at 1137.
57. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
58. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1137 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1142 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1.25 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
61. Id. at 1142-44.
62. Id. at 1144.
No. 1]
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argued, Congress has expressed its intent to overcome that presumption, and
it has the clear authority to do so."
Justice Stevens ended with an unusually direct reproach of the majority
opinion. "It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority
has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the
better reasoning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion
will surely be the law one day."'
D. Justice Souter's Dissent - Joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer
In his dissent, Justice Souter boldly attacked Hans by employing a lengthy
analysis of the historical origins of sovereign immunity. He determined that
the Eleventh Amendment only limits federal jurisdiction in cases of citizen-
state diversity, not in cases where federal questions are implicated.' Souter's
assertion was that since the plaintiffs in the case at bar are citizens of the
State that they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to them.'
Therefore, Souter argued that the Court must look elsewhere for the source
of the immunity that the State cited.67
Justice Souter maintained that the source the majority was relying upon
was the common-law doctrine of state sovereign immunity, as it was wrongly
promoted to the status of constitutional law." Souter, like Stevens, contended
that the Court in Hans v. Louisiana had not considered whether Congress
could abrogate common-law sovereign immunity by statute. Indeed, he argued
that this issue was not specifically addressed until the Supreme Court decided
in Union Gas that such immunity had no constitutional status and was subject
to abrogation.' The Hans Court wrongly decided, it was argued, that the
common law principle of sovereign immunity barred a suit brought against a
state by one of its own citizens under federal question jurisdiction.70 The
majority's determination that the simple common law doctrine is now
constitutional law "takes its place with other historic examples of textually
untethered elevations of judicially derived rules to the status of inviolable
constitutional law."
7 1
Justice Souter concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars litigation based
on the status of the parties only - and only when they are suing on
nonfederal claims. The amendment, he argued, has no applicability to Article
63. Id. at 1138.
64. Id. at 1145.
65. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).









I federal question jurisdiction.' Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter
concluded that Hans could be preserved as a matter of stare decisis" but that
it had no applicability when Congress clearly intended to abrogate state
immunity.'
Justice Souter further argued that, even if the Eleventh Amendment
shielded the state from suit, the doctrine of Ex parte Young75 should provide
relief for the tribe against the state Governor. Emphasizing the jurisdictional
rather than remedial nature of the Young rule,76 Justice Souter maintained that
Congress' mentioning of the word "State" in the statutory scheme should "not
limit the possible defendants to States and is quite literally consistent with the
possibility that a tribe could sue an appropriate state official for a State's
failure to negotiate.""
Moreover, Justice Souter argued that the fact that a suit against a state
official under the Ex parte Young doctrine may have had a significant impact
on state government did not invalidate the doctrine's application.7 Souter
explored the history of the doctrine and defended it as more than mere
judicial fiction." Justice Souter determined that there was no clear statement
of intent to displace the Ex parte Young doctrine in the IGRA. In fact, in no
way did Souter find that the IGRA's "intricate remedial mechanisms"
displaced the doctrine in the case at bar. Therefore, Justice Souter argued that
the Supreme Court should have reversed the Appellate Court's judgment.'
IV. Analysis
A. The Text of the 11th Amendment - Diversity Jurisdiction
The express language of the Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'" Just from
reading the text, the most plausible interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
is probably that the Amendment bars diversity actions brought by a citizen of
one state against another state." However, other interpretations have been proffered.
72. Id. at 1150.
73. Id. at 1159.
74. Id. at 1159-60.
75. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
76. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1182 at 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Young did not
establish a new cause of action ... It stands, instead, for a jurisdictional rule ... .
77. Id. at 1183.
78. Id. at 1178.
79. Id. at 1180.
80. Id. at 1185.
81. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
82. Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
No. 1]
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute that the meaning of the Amendment -
derived either textually or historically - is the one aforementioned.' A simple
reading of the plain language of the text promptly reveals that the Amendment
grants immunity to a state, but only from diversity actions brought by citizens
of another state. Moreover, from a practical perspective, the Amendment nearly
duplicates Article I's Diversity Jurisdiction Clause." Therefore, its textual
meaning is clear. The Amendment bars actions brought against the state by a
citizen(s) of another state. Thus, one need look no further - the Framers' intent
is readily apparent from the express language of the Eleventh Amendment.'
The very words of the Amendment then should slam the door shut in the
face of those wishing to bring suit against the state if they are, in fact, citizens
of another state basing their claim on diversity jurisdiction. However, the door
should be opened wide for those citizens of the same state wishing to bring their
federal question claims arising under congressional authority. Although this
seemingly disparate treatment may seem unfair, the Amendment was specifically
designed to reach a much fairer compromise and thereby deny only those suits
based on diversity jurisdiction. An inquiry into the historical origins of the
Eleventh Amendment will provide the policy reasons behind the Amendment's
bar on diversity actions and reveal the framers' intent.
The historical debate over the Eleventh Amendment was concerned mainly
with private actions to collect war debts owed by the states." There were two
sides to this debate: (1) those from debt-ridden states proposing a liberal
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2239 (1996). This is an
outstanding commentary on the Supreme Court's treatment of both decisions.
83. For example, the Amendment (plus any penumbra) bars (1) both diversity actions and
federal question actions by any citizen against any state, including the citizen's own state, unless
Congress makes clear that the federal statute at issue is designed to abrogate state sovereign
immunity; (2) same as (1), except that citizens are not barred from suing their own state; and (3)
same as (1), except that Congress is not allowed to abrogate the immunity. Hovenkamp, supra
note 82, at 2239.
84. See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply
to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1280-82 (1989).
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, .. . between a State and Citizens of another State").
86. See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987). As
Amar stated:
If the Eleventh Amendment's framers had intended a broad sovereign immunity
principle applicable even in federal question cases, they knew the words: [TI]hat
no State shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the Judicial Courts
established or to be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit
of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate
whether within or without the United States.
Id. at 1481. However, the Framers did not choose these words. Instead, they chose the words that
can be found in the express language of the Eleventh Amendment.
87. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2240 (citing Justice Marshall's account in Cohens v.




doctrine of sovereign immunity from both diversity and federal question lawsuits
(which would then force creditors into the state courts of the debtor state where
sovereign immunity would no doubt be asserted), and (2) those who wanted to
limit state sovereign immunity to diversity cases, thus permitting federal
question jurisdiction.'
In different sessions of Congress, alternative proposals reflecting these two
sides were offered. The first was by a representative from Massachusetts named
Theodore Sedgwick' This proposal, made by the representative of a state with
heavy war debts, "would have created a broad doctrine of state sovereign
immunity that closed federal courts to all suits against states, whether by citizens
or non-citizens."'  As a result, this proposal would have barred not only
diversity jurisdiction but federal question jurisdiction as well' What must be
remembered, however, is that this proposal was rejected. The adopted version
of the Eleventh Amendment concerned only diversity jurisdiction suits (suits
brought against a state by a citizen of a different state).
As with any Amendment, the Eleventh was forged through compromise.
There were strong competing interests - those of the fledgling states who
needed a degree of protection to keep from becoming impoverished and those
of foreign nationals who needed some degree of recourse to keep our country
from suffering foreign relations problems. 3 Upon first glance, it would seem
the states' diversity-jurisdiction immunity would prevent all suits by foreign
nationals; however, this was not the case. The reason was because Congress had
enacted the Treaty of Paris. Thus, suits under the Treaty by foreign nationals
would effectively "arise under" Article III's federal question jurisdiction."
Simply put, the Treaty of Paris allowed our foreign creditors - those who
helped us gain our Independence by providing the necessary funds to wage our
88. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2240.
89. Id. at 2240-41.
90. Id. at 2240.
91. Id. Sedgwick's proposal stated:
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United
States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a
foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or
without the United States.
Id. at 2240 n.127.
92. Id. at 2240-41 (quoting Rep. James Elliott of Vermont). Representative Elliot had offered
a resolution supporting the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, "for
confining the judiciary power of the Courts of the United States to cases in law and equity,
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall
be made under their authority; ... [and] cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ...." 16
ANNALS OF CONG. 216 (1806) (statement of Rep. Elliott). Elliott's interpretation was that the
amendment merely limited federal jurisdiction in suits against states to federal question cases, but
did allow suit in such cases. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2240-41 n.128.
93. See Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2240.
94. Id.
No. 1]
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Revolutionary War - to collect the money we owed to them. Had the
Amendment applied to federal question cases as well as diversity cases, it would
have rendered those debts uncollectible, and then our nation would have been
perceived as financially unsound in the realm of the nation states. Moreover, as
Souter noted, "[i]f the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment had meant it to
immunize states from federal question suits like those that might be brought to
enforce the Treaty of Paris, they would surely have drafted the Amendment
differently.""S
Ultimately, however, regardless of foreign relations problems and matters of
war debts, it seems that giving the states absolute immunity from both federal
question actions as well as diversity actions is simply too dangerous. Early on,
those who dealt with this issue understood the Amendment's plain textual
meaning and the policy reasons behind the limitation. Justice Marshall, for
example, recognized a danger in giving the Amendment any broader of a
meaning than was already apparent on its face. The danger was that states
might shirk their federal obligations, such as those created by the Constitution's
Contract Clause, thereby allowing the states to effectively deprive citizens of
their federal rights. If the Amendment bars all claims, both those in federal
question as well as diversity, then the federal rights that all citizens claim and
seek to have protected would be rendered void for lack of federal jurisdiction."
What is the value of a federal claim without a federal court to enforce it? The
answer is as obvious now as it was then. Therefore, the history of the Eleventh
Amendment reveals that the Framers' intent was to limit state sovereign
immunity to diversity. But this, of course, does not mean that the majority in
Seminole paid the respect due to either the history or to the text of our Eleventh
Amendment.
B. Hans - Federal Question Jurisdiction
In Hans v. Louisiana, the, Supreme Court expanded the scope of the
Amendment's "sovereignty grant" to include federal questions.7 The Court,
however, did not address the issue of congressional power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.
Ham, v. Louisiana held that a citizen could not assert federal rights against
his own state in the federal court without the state's consent." In Hans, a state
citizen sued under federal question jurisdiction based upon the state's alleged
violation of the Contracts Clause.w The Hans court held that it would be
95. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1151 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Fletcher,
supra note 84, at 1280-82).
96. See Hovenkanp, supra note 82, at 2240.
97. See Hans v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) ("[A] State cannot be sued by a citizen of
another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.").
98. Id. at 15.




inconsistent to deny a state's sovereign immunity in an action by a citizen of the
same state, yet allow an action by a citizen of a different state. Thus, the Court
in Hans decided to allow the state its sovereign immunity in both instances. The
Court turned a blind eye to the fact that its holding runs contrary to both the
plain language of the Eleventh Amendment and the Amendment's history.
The Court relied on Hamilton's remarks in Number 81 of the Federalist:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense
and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of
every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
States.1°
Thus, the Hans Court's analysis was based on a highly controversial
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. An interpretation which seems
logically inconsistent.
The best conception for those attempting to reconcile the Court's reasoning
in Hans with the text of the Eleventh Amendment was that the federal question
sovereign immunity provided by Hans exists only as a matter of federal
"constitutional" common law. This 'judge-recognized" common law is
enforceable by the courts, but only until Congress expressly provides
otherwise."' Therefore, under this rationale, Hans merely supplied us with a
federal common law doctrine in effect only until Congress clearly abrogates it,
(and Congress has clearly done so with its enactment of the IGRA!).
C. The Majoritys Reasoning Is Flawed!
The overly broad interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, such as those
adopted by Hans and Seminole Tribe, am unjustified both textually and
historically. What is remarkable, however, is that even those justices who are
widely known as strict "textualists" have welcomed an interpretation of our
Constitution that is completely separate from any words that can be found
within the text. For example, Justice Scalia, who helped form the majority in
Seminole, and who is a respected constitutional law scholar, noted in his dissent
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that the "plain text of the Amendment makes
times) the clause created an implied right of action.
100. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
101. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-30 (1975).
102. Justices Stevens and Souter argued that Hans never addressed the question of Congress'
power to abrogate immunity. As a result, they maintained that any congressional abrogation of
common law sovereign immunity would not be constitutionally prohibited. See Seminole Tribe,
116 S. Ct. at 1137-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1153 (Souter, J., dissenting).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
clear that the Framers were talking about diversity actions and not federal
question actions."'" However, Scalia continued by stating:
What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh
Amendment was important not merely for what is said but for what
it reflected: a consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
for States as well as for the Federal Government, was part of the
understood background against which the Constitution was adopted,
and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep
away.ID
This argument did not get very far - even with Scalia. He must have
realized that this argument contradicts his own repeated theory that the
"Constitution can mean no more than the plain, contemporary understanding of
its words.""3 Therefore, Justice Scalia ultimately "rested on stare decisis and
Hans.
,,IC6
Justice Souter responded to this argument in Seminole by stating that "the
Court [majority] is not struggling to fulfill a responsibility to reconcile two
arguably conflicting ...constitutional provisions, nor is it struggling with
any... text at all."" Souter continued by stating he could remember only
one other occasion where the Court had extended its own reach so far as to
declare that the plain text of our Constitution is actually subordinate to the
Court's own judicially discoverable principles, unconnected to any written
provision in the Constitution." Souter told of a Justice who had taken this
position almost 200 years ago. Souter concluded that this position was: "no less
in conflict with American constitutionalism in 1798, than it is today. Such a
position is clearly inconsistent with the Framers' view of the Constitution as
fundamental law."'"
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist's "constitutional analysis" in Seminole
was just nothing short of the opposite. Instead of analyzing and applying the text
or considering the history of our Constitution, Rehnquist chose instead to rely
upon Alexander Hamilton's words in Number 81 of the Federalist. In this
103. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2242.
104. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) and citing Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
105. Id. at 2243.
106. Id. (citing Justice Scalia who stated the "mere venerability of an answer consistently
adhered to for almost a century [referring to Hans] and the difficulty of changing, or even clearly
identifying, the intervening law that has been based on that answer, strongly argue against a
change." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). This cite demonstrates that Scalia
the "textualist" makes a strong appeal to tradition while ignoring the text of our Eleventh
Amendment.






document, Hamilton asserts his belief that "the Constitution preserved the
traditional doctrine of state sovereign immunity.""0
Yet, as denoted by Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole, the context of
Hamilton's discussion in Number 81 of the Federalist was common law suits
against the states for nonpayment of war debts. Hamilton stated "that an
assignment of the public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would
enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for the amount of those
securities."'.. Hamilton's statement clearly disallows the use of Number 81 of
the Federalist in support of federal question jurisdiction. This is true because
in Hamilton's suggestion, the "assignment" was what created the jurisdiction in
the first place."' Hamilton was speaking of cases that could have only been
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist's numerous
citations from Hamilton in Number 81 of the Federalist states no more than that
the states were presumed to preserve their common law sovereign immunity in
diversity lawsuits. "Hamilton was not even discussing federal question
lawsuits.
'' m
This is truly nothing short of remarkable. Number 81 of the Federalist, cited
by Rehnquist in support of his position, actually does not support his position
yet likely supports the contrary position taken by both Stevens and Souter.
In fact, Souter's own statement on this issue is telling:
In sum, either the majority reads Hamilton as I do, to say nothing
about sovereignty or immunity in such a [federal question] case, or
it will have to read him to say something about it that bars any
state immunity claim. That is the dilemma of the majority's reliance
on Hamilton's Federalist 81.... Either way, he [Hamilton] is no
authority for the Court's position."'
D. Congress' Power to Abrogate the Common Law
Even assuming Hans is worthy as precedent, the Seminole Tribe holding
remains unjustified. Hans involved the Constitution's Contract Clause, not a
federal statute. Thus, it did not speak to the issue of congressional power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity through an act of Congress.'
110. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (1996) (quoting THE FEDERALIsT No. 81, at 487
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton)); Id. at 1130. This position was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793).
111. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1166 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
112. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 80 (1923).
113. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2243; see also Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1166
(Souter, J., dissenting).
114. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1168 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The decision in Seminole Tribe, however, goes beyond Hans and holds that
Congress now lacks the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Hans
clearly does not support this newfound contention by the Court. Moreover, since
the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not once mention state sovereign
immunity from, federal question claims, congressional power to abrogate is not
included there either. In fact, until Seminole Tribe, sovereign immunity was still
regarded as a common law doctrine, and the simple truth of the matter is that
Congress, acting within its delegated powers, has the authority to abrogate the
common law. 5 Simply put, "Congress preempts common law rules all the
time."'t6 Most attorneys, law students, and judges (including Supreme Court
Justices) are already aware of this. For this reason, Justice Scalia in his Union
Gas dissent and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Seminole Tribe were forced to raise
sovereign immunity to a constitutional law status. They did so by relying on the
position that the Constitution, although expressly silent, mysteriously contains
the constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is
no longer a simple common law doctrine. Now it's constitutional law."7
V. Ex Parte Young
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that even though the state itself
might be immune, a federal court may assert its jurisdiction against a state
officer whose action violates the applicable federal law."' In Seminole,
however, the majority attempted to argue that the doctrine of Young should not
apply. The majority argued that the IGRA's remedial scheme actually displaced
the use of Young.
Justice Souter pointed out, however, that Young does not create one kind of
remedy and Congress another. Young, instead stands for a jurisdictional rule,
i.e., if one is barred from suing an immune party (the State) then one may
proceed against a non-immune party (the officer). Therefore, a case may depend
upon Young for its federal jurisdiction and on Congress for its remedy. Thus,
Young in no way displaces the procedural rules devised by Congress such as the
IGRA.
Moreover, Souter, in his dissent, articulated a very simple truth, i.e., the
doctrine of Young came about as a consequence of Hans. Since Hans granted
115. Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 2245.
116. /d.
117. The irony is that the word "sovereignty" never appears in the Constitution. It does not
appear in the Eleventh Amendment, nor in any other Amendment, including the Tenth
Amendment where one might expect it to be. The language of the Eleventh Amendment
obviously suggests some narrow degree of immunity for the states in diversity cases. Federal
question sovereign immunity, however, is no where to be found until the Court in Hamv
recognized it as a common law doctrine - one that Congress would obviously be capable of
abrogating (that is, until the Seminole decision improperly raised this common law doctrine to the
status of constitutional law). See Amar, supra note 86, at 1456.




state immunity in federal question cases, Young was necessary to "vindicate the
federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.""' In fact, since the
Court understood the negative implications of its Hans decision, it was therefore
forced to create the doctrine espoused in Young. As Souter stated: "[Young was
created to provide] a sensible view of immunity expressed in Hans with the
principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article IlI."' In other
words, the doctrine of Young was created to serve those plaintiffs whose actions
were barred as a result of the Court's "judicially discovered" federal question
'immunity. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that if one is barred under a
Hans analysis (such as in the instant case) then the doctrine of Young should be
used to remedy that loss. After all, Young was created by the Supreme Court
to be used in exactly that situation.
The majority's denial of Young, however, should come as no surprise. The
majority is merely being consistent with the rest of its opinion in Seminole
Tribe.
VI. IGRA and States' Rights
As previously stated, in Seminole Tribe the majority struck down certain
provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,' passed by Congress under
its power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. That Act permitted
Indian tribes to conduct certain types of gaming only if the state permits the
same type of gaming "for any purpose by any person, organization, or
entity,'"" and the tribe has a compact with the state in which the tribal lands
are located. Under the Act, a state was obligated to negotiate in good faith to
create such a compact. If the state failed to do so, then the tribe could sue the
state in federal court.
On its face, one might view the Gaming Act as an attempt to force states to
negotiate with Indian tribes to permit unwanted casino gambling on Indian lands
located in the state. But under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has
plenary power, i.e., the absolute power to apply its own law to the Indian lands
and preempt all state law.I" Simply put, Congress could have plainly passed
a statute authorizing casino gambling on Indian lands, giving no protection to
the states and completely siding in favor of Indian tribes. Had Congress enacted
119. 1d
120. Id.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994).
122. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
123. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,221-22 (1987)
(holding that the state has no authority to regulate gambling on Indian lands); County of Oneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (regulation of activities on Indian lands is the
exclusive province of federal law); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1973) (holding state law not generally applicable on Indian lands except where Congress
so permits). This doctrine of exclusive federal sovereignty dates back to Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
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legislation of this sort, there would be no controversy. Congress, however,
chose an evenhanded approach in enacting the IGRA and therefore considered
the states' interests involved. In fact, the states themselves were a principal
protagonist and beneficiary of the IGRA, which gave them a measure of control
over Indian gaming that the Indian Commerce Clause would clearly deny
them."M The provision requiring a "compact" between the state and the tribe
was an attempt by Congress to avoid either: (1) complete preemption of state
law (which would be the case absent a federal statute recognizing a state right);
or (2) a federal statute giving states the authority to regulate gaming on Indian
lands.i
Thus, the IGRA was a compromise. The act was clearly not an attempt by
the federal government to diminish state authority. Instead, the IGRA was a
good faith effort to accommodate state interests and concerns.
VII. Union Gas - Lifts the Mystery from This Decision
Aside from the debate over Indian's gaming rights, however, it seems
apparent that the Supreme Court had its own reasons for granting certiorari in
Seminole. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a plurality of the Court held
that the Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Because of subsequent appointments to the Court, the
Justices who formed the minority in Union Gas perceived an opportunity to
reverse that decision. In sum, the newly formed majority has been longing for
a case involving Congress' attempted abrogation of state sovereign immunity
through the Interstate Commerce Clause in order to implicate Union Gas and
reverse it. What they got was legislation passed pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause. This was close enough for the Court. Moreover, the
majority wanted to restrain Congress from enacting legislation that supposedly
interferes with states' sovereign rights. Thus, the Supreme Court seized this
newfound opportunity, reversed Union Gas, and held that neither the Indian
Commerce Clause nor the Interstate Commerce Clause grant Congress the
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.'" This goes a long way to
lifting the mystery of a constitutional law decision which abandons the
Constitution in favor of Number 81 of the Federalist and a squinted view
beyond the text."
124. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 2-3, 5 (1988). Another protagonist of the legislation was
gaming interests from Nevada, which sought to limit the extent of Indian gaming.
125. See Roland J. Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here?
Where Art We Going?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 387, 395-403 (1993).
126. .491 U.S. 1 (1989).
127. See Pat Smith, Point: Seminole Tribe of Florida Victory For States' Rights; Indian
Gaming Act Caught in the Crossfire, MONT. LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 21.
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Assuming that this is a justifiable explanation for the Courts decision, the
practical problem with the Court's reasoning is twofold. First, if the majority is
attempting to make a ruling in favor of state's rights, it need only uphold the
IGRA. As previously noted, Congress enacted the compacting requirement to
benefit the states, not the Indians. In fact, the provision was included over the
objection of the Indians. Congress chose a reasonable requirement, taking into
account the states' and the Indians' rights. It seems illogical for the majority to
strike down this provision under the guise of benefitting the states.
Second, even if the majority's desire was to benefit the states, there is really
no reason why the doctrine of Ex parte Young also should be held inapplicable.
This doctrine should have been used to provide a reasonable compromise, i.e.,
the Court could overturn Union Gas but leave room for the Indians' claim under
Ex parte Young. The majority's insistence on closing both doors is not just
mysterious, it seems downright ludicrous.
VIII. Conclusion
The majority in Seminole Tribe is blind - both to the obvious meaning of
the text of our Constitution and to the Framers who established it. The Seminole
Tribe decision improperly raises a simple and undeniable common law doc-
trine -federal question sovereign immunity - to the unjustifiable status of
constitutional law. Indeed, the Supreme Court's use of stare decisis through
Hans utterly fails, going far beyond any fair reading required by precedent. The
Supreme Court's interpretation in Seminole should provoke outrage among those
who are sincerely committed to upholding the integrity of the United States
Constitution. Simply put, it is the Court's responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, not ignore it, and the Court's analysis in Seminole Tribe ignores
both the text and the history of the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, the IGRA was intended to provide a means of tribal self-
sufficiency while protecting states' rights. So, now a Court, which appears to
favor states' rights, has put Congress in the position of rewriting the legislation
to accommodate only Indian concerns. Furthermore, the doctrine of Ex parte
Young could have formed a reasonable compromise, but the Court's
unwillingness to apply this doctrine merely reveals its callous approach to such
issues.
Overall, the Court's reasons for granting certiorari and deciding Seminole in
such an entirely unjustified manner defy common sense, yet the Supreme Court
did so. Whether the Indians are victims of some real battle being waged by the
majority against the decision in Union Gas, or whether the Court truly believes
in its own unprecedented legal analysis, the case remains a testament to the
casualties the Court inflicts when it engages in outcome determinative decision
making. The great buffalo which roamed the plains centuries ago are almost
entirely extinct. If Congress does not correct what the Court has done, the
extinction of the "New Buffalo" might soon follow.
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